Existing studies have argued that market-wide sentiment primarily affects individual noise traders, rather than other sophisticated market participants. Contrary to this perspective, in this study, we find that financial analysts, who are sophisticated market participants, may be more vulnerable to sentiment than their peers. As a reason for this vulnerability, we focus on analysts' preference for growth investing, and predict that, due to this preference, their fair value estimations for growth stocks would be more upwardly biased by bullish market-wide sentiment than those of their market peers. We also predict that this biased estimation for growth stocks would lower the investment value of their recommendations. As is consistent with our predictions, we find that, especially during periods of bullish sentiment, analysts consider growth stocks to be undervalued, even though these stocks are in fact overvalued. In addition, we find that recommended stocks experience poor relative return performance, especially after periods of bullish sentiment, and that this poor performance is not observed after controlling for growth factors.
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Introduction
Several behavioral finance studies have argued that correlated investor sentiment drives stock prices away from their fundamental values (De Long et al. 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . As is consistent with this argument, studies have shown that time-varying market-wide sentiment affects cross-sectional stock returns. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Wurgler (2006, 2007) have used a measure of market-wide investor sentiment to show that difficult-to-value stocks (i.e., small, young, volatile stocks) are overvalued, especially when investor sentiment is high. Antoniou et al. (2013) show that investor sentiment is positively associated with the profitability of price momentum strategies. Meanwhile, Stambaugh et al. (2012) conclude that anomalies are stronger and entail higher potential profits in periods following high sentiment. Such effects of sentiment are usually attributed to individual noise traders, since market-wide sentiment is considered to primarily affect these traders (De Long et al. 1990; Shleifer and Summers 1990; Lee et al. 1991 ).
On the other hand, Brown and Cliff (2004) cast doubt on the view that market-wide sentiment primarily affects individual noise traders. They argue that the sentiment effect not only influences individual noise traders, but professional investors as well. In line with their argument, several studies have shown the effects of sentiment on professional financial analysts, who are typically regarded as sophisticated market participants. Bagnoli et al. (2009) have reported that some analysts are sensitive to market-wide sentiment, and that the recommendations of these analysts are less profitable than those of their peers. Walther and Willis (2013) show that bullish market-wide investor sentiment induces optimistic earnings forecasts. Hribar and McInnis (2012) find that investor sentiment affects the earnings expectations for firms that are difficult to evaluate. In sum, these studies show that analysts are influenced by market-wide sentiment. However, they only demonstrate that financial analysts are, at some level, influenced by market-wide sentiment, which significantly influences individual noise traders. As such, they neither support nor go against the conventional wisdom that market-wide sentiment primarily affects individual noise traders rather than other more sophisticated market participants. 2 In this study, we provide counter-evidence to this conventional wisdom, i.e. we show that financial analysts, who are regarded as sophisticated market participants, may be more vulnerable to sentiment than their market peers.
As a reason for analysts' vulnerability to sentiment, we focus on their excessive preference for 4 growth investing which is not aligned with investment value of their stock recommendations. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) have shown that analysts tend to focus excessively on growth investment, due to the economic incentives involved, such as promoting a firm's investment banking business (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Barber et al., 2007; Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008) , and boosting brokerage trading revenue (Jackson, 2005; Irvine et al., 2007) . This behavior results in favorable recommendations for growth stocks (i.e., positive momentum, high trading volume, high growth, and overvalued stocks). Jegadeesh et al. (2004) show that this behavior is not aligned with the investment value of stock recommendations, except when analysts prefer momentum stocks.
The valuation of a firm's growth component is highly sensitive to investor beliefs about discount rates. Excessively low estimated discount rates lead investors to overvalue a firm's growth components. In addition, investor sentiment may reflect investor beliefs about discount rates that are not supported by prevailing economic and financial fundamentals (Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006; Baker and Wurgler 2006) . Given that analysts' discount rate estimations commove with those of investors, analysts' preferences for growth investing could make their fair value estimates more sensitive to sentiment. More specifically, due to these preferences, analysts' fair value estimates for growth stocks may be more upwardly biased by bullish market-wide sentiment than those of other market participants. As such, analysts tend to consider growth stocks to be undervalued, especially during periods of bullish market-wide sentiment, even if growth stocks are actually overvalued during those periods. In addition, we argue that this behavior is not at all aligned with the investment performance of stock recommendations, meaning that analysts' biased evaluations during periods of bullish sentiment could negatively impact the investment performance of recommended stocks. Thus, recommended stocks could experience low stock returns, especially after periods of bullish sentiment, due to excessive optimism about growth stocks during those periods.
In this study, we engage in empirical analyses that test these possibilities. We use the Baker and Wurgler (BW) market-wide investor sentiment index and the Michigan consumer sentiment index to explore market-wide sentiment effects.
Our findings support our predictions. First, we find that growth stocks are more overvalued during periods of higher sentiment. Second, we find that analysts consider growth stocks to be more undervalued when investor sentiment is higher. These findings support the argument that fair value estimation is more upwardly biased by bullish investor sentiment than by the input of other market participants. Finally, we find that recommended stocks experience lower stock returns following periods of higher investor sentiment. This poor relative return performance of recommended stocks 5 after periods of bullish sentiment can be observed even after controlling for difficult-to-value factors.
However, this poor performance is not observed when we control for growth factors. These findings indicate that the poor return performance of recommended stocks during periods of bullish sentiment is induced by the poor performance of growth stocks during such periods. In other words, our findings support the inference that analysts' biased views on growth stocks during periods of bullish sentiment lower the performance of recommended stocks.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the development of our hypotheses.
Section 3 describes our sample and our definitions of growth indicators. Section 4 offers an analysis of the association between sentiment and the valuation of growth stocks. Section 5 analyses the effect of sentiment on analysts' views on growth stocks. Section 6 explores whether analysts' optimism about growth stocks during periods of bullish sentiment lowers the relative performance of recommended stocks. Section 7 assesses whether analysts' vulnerability to sentiment is induced by their irrational discount rate estimations or earnings forecast errors. Finally, our findings are summarized in Section 8.
Hypothesis development
We begin our study by examining whether analysts' preference for growth investing results in their excessive sensitivity to market-wide sentiment. Evaluations of a firm's growth components are highly sensitive to discount rate estimations. In addition, market-wide sentiment reflects consensus about discount rates. Analysts' discount rate estimates commove consensus estimates. As such, their fair value estimates, which are more influenced by firms' growth components than those of other market participants, may be particularly prone to sentiment. More specifically, analysts' fair value estimates for growth firms may be more upwardly biased by bullish sentiment than those of other market participants. In other words, analysts could consider growth stocks to be undervalued during periods of bullish sentiment, even though those stocks are likely to be overvalued during such periods. To test whether this is the case, we decompose our prediction into two parts. The first is that growth stocks will be more overvalued during periods of higher sentiment. The second is that analysts consider the growth stocks involved to be attractive (undervalued) during those periods.
Overvalued stocks are highly likely to underperform in periods subsequent to those of higher sentiment. Thus, our first prediction can be described by the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The relative return performance of growth stocks is lower when beginning-of-period investor sentiment is higher.
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Analysts' favorable (buy) recommendations for a stock indicate that they consider the stock to be undervalued. Thus, our second prediction can be described with the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Growth stocks receive more favorable stock recommendations during periods of higher investor sentiment.
If both hypothesis 1 and 2 are supported, this indicates that analysts' fair value estimates for growth stocks are more upwardly biased by bullish market-wide sentiment than those of other market participants. This biased estimation could have a negative impact on the performance of recommended stocks. In particular, analysts' excessive optimism about growth stocks during periods of bullish sentiment could result in the poor relative performance of their recommended stocks during such periods.
3 To test this prediction, we divide it into two parts. The first is that recommended stocks experience lower subsequent stock returns after periods of higher sentiment, while the second is that their poor relative performance during periods of bullish sentiment can be attributed to the excessive optimism about growth stocks during such periods. Our hypothesis regarding the above-mentioned first prediction is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Stocks with favorable recommendations experience lower returns following a period of higher investor sentiment.
If analysts' aggressive views on growth stocks during periods of bullish sentiment account for their poor performance after such periods, the poor performance should not be observed after controlling for growth factors. Thus, our hypothesis regarding the above-mentioned second prediction can be described as follows:
Hypothesis 4: There is no significant negative association between beginning-of-period investor sentiment and the relative return performance of recommended stocks after controlling for growth factors.
Data and definitions
Growth Characteristics
In this study, we consider two direct growth indicators (i.e., past sales growth and analysts' long-term growth forecasts) and three indirect growth measures (i.e., turnover ratio, book-to-price, 7
and earnings-to-price). Jegadeesh et al. (2004) show that analysts' preference for growth investing based on these indicators is not aligned with the investment value of their stock recommendations.
Further details on the growth indicators used in our study are as follows: (Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta, 1996) .
Indirect growth indicators: We first consider TURN i,t , which is the average daily volume turnover for a stock in the preceding six months. Since high turnover stocks have growth properties (Lee and Swaminathan 2000) 5 , we regard these stocks as growth stocks. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that stocks experiencing high turnover earn lower returns in subsequent months. In addition, we consider two variables concerning valuation:
earnings-to-price ratio (EP i,t ) 6 and book-to-price ratio (BP i,t ). 7 We regard stocks with low EP i,t
or BP i,t as growth stocks. Basu (1977) have shown that low EP firms underperform high EP firms. In addition, Fama and French (1992) have shown that low BP stocks underperform high BP stocks.
Sample
We obtain our sample of analysts' recommendations from the unadjusted Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) summary file. We collect data on all common stocks and excluded the shares of non-US firms. We also exclud stocks that had not received more than three analysts' recommendations and those priced below $5 (penny stocks), to ensure that our empirical findings are not driven by low-coverage stocks and low-priced stocks. 8 We utilize monthly data from the end of 1993 until the end of 2010. On average, there are approximately 2,000 firms in our sample for each month.
As mentioned earlier, for the main part of our analysis, we measure investor sentiment by using the monthly time series of the BW investor sentiment index and the Michigan consumer sentiment 4 Sales are defined as the rolling sum of sales for the preceding four quarters. 5 They show that stocks with high TURN i,t tend to receive high long-term growth forecasts. 6 EP is defined as the rolling sum of EPS for the preceding four quarters, deflated by price. 7 BP is defined as the book value of total common equity at the end of the most recent quarter, deflated by price. 8 We note, however, that our empirical results do not appear to vary based on the exclusion of low-coverage stocks and penny stocks.
8 index, 9 since these indices are commonly used in extant investor-sentiment studies. To ensure that both indices were free of macroeconomic influences, following the approach taken by Baker and
Wurgler, we conduct our investigation by using an orthogonal version of the indices, which is obtained by regressing the indices against a set of macroeconomic variables. 10 Figure 1 plots the two series. The two sentiment indices rise during the late 1990s and fall during the early 2000s.
These patterns are in line with the evidence for investor sentiment discussed by Baker and Wurgler.
[ Figure 1 ]
Relative returns of growth stocks
In this section, we test hypothesis 1, which posits that growth stocks experience lower stock returns when beginning-of-period sentiment is higher.
Methodology
We first examine the association between beginning-of-period market-wide investor sentiment and the return performance of growth stocks (stocks with high SG, LTG, and TURN and with low BP and EP) relative to that for non-growth stocks.
We find that unadjusted raw growth indicators tend to contain large outliers. For example, the growth indicators for firms that grow from low positive values of base-year net income typically include large outliers. To reduce the influence of these outliers on our results, following the approach taken by Hess et al. (2013) , we calculate the decile ranks of firms' growth characteristics for each month's end. The decile ranks of SG i,t , LTG i,t , TURN i,t , EP i,t , and BP i,t are denoted as dSG i,t , dLTG i,t , dTURN i,t , dEP i,t , and dBP i,t , respectively. We code decile ranks so that stocks with more growth characteristics receive higher scores. The bottom 10% of observations within direct growth indicators and the trading volume indicator (SG, LTG, and TURN) are assigned a rank of "1," while the top 10% are given a rank of "10." On the other hand, since stocks with low BP and EP are regarded as growth stocks, we give stocks with lower EP and BP higher scores. In those cases, the top 10% receives a rank of "1," while the bottom 10% group receives a rank of "10."
Then, following a study by Honcoop and Lehnert (2007) , we perform the following two-step 9 regression analysis.
( (2) We examine whether the time-varying regression coefficient t As ,  is associated with the proxies of market-wide investor sentiment by running the following regression: 
Results
The regression results are shown in Table 1 . The results indicate the possibility that growth stocks experience lower stock returns when the beginning-of-period sentiment index is higher. The coefficient t As ,  is significantly negatively associated with the BW index and the Michigan index, regardless of which growth characteristic is used. These results strongly support Hypothesis 1, which posits that the relative return performance of growth stocks is negatively associated with investor sentiment. In other words, our findings support the inference that growth stocks are more overvalued when sentiment is higher.
[ Table 1 ] 11 We also analyze whether the return spread between the top and bottom growth characteristic quintiles is negatively associated with the beginning-of-period investor sentiment index. Our results (available upon request) reveal that the return spread is negatively associated with that index, supporting the view that the relative returns of growth stocks are negatively associated with beginning-of-period market-wide investor sentiment.
Aggressive views on growth stocks
Evaluation of analysts' preferences
To test whether growth stocks receive more favorable recommendations during periods of higher sentiment, we first evaluate the cross-sectional relationships between stock recommendations and stocks' growth characteristics at the end of each month. We then analyze whether these time-varying relationships are associated with a monthly investor sentiment index.
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More specifically, following the studies of Jegadeesh et al. (2004) and Hess et al. (2013) , we evaluate analysts' bullish views on growth stocks, in terms of how much they consider growth stocks to be undervalued, based on the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between consensus (mean) stock recommendations 13 and stocks' growth characteristics at the end of each month. Since stocks with high SG, LTG, or TURN are regarded as growth stocks, a high correlation coefficient between consensus recommendations and these growth characteristics (SG, LTG, and TURN) implies that analysts have aggressive views on these growth stocks. In addition, since stocks with low EP or low BP are regarded as growth stocks, a low (negative) correlation coefficient between consensus recommendations and these valuation characteristics (EP and BP) also implies analysts' aggressive views on these growth stocks. To make this easier to understand, we calculate and report the correlation coefficients between ranked stock recommendations and inversed-ranked EP or BP, with higher values implying more aggressive views on growth stocks.
In addition, we evaluate analysts' bullish views on growth stocks based on the difference in growth characteristics between favorably recommended stocks and the least favorably recommended stocks. For the end of each month, we divide the stocks into quintiles, ranging from REC5
(recommended stocks) to REC1 (stocks least favorably recommended), on the basis of consensus in recommendations. We also calculate the averages of the growth characteristics' decile ranks for each recommendation quintile. If decile ranks are higher for REC5 than for REC1, it is likely that analysts consider the growth stocks involved to be attractive (undervalued).
After evaluating analysts' aggressive views on growth stocks for the end of each month, we examine the association between market-wide investor sentiment and time-varying analysts' views on growth stocks. We run regressions of the following types: 
Results
The results of our regression are shown in Table 2 . They reveal that both Corr and Spread (the In the previous section, we demonstrate that growth stocks are more overvalued during periods of higher sentiment. In this section, we show that analysts consider those stocks to be undervalued during such periods. Both of these findings indicate that fair value estimates by analysts are more upwardly biased by bullish market-wide sentiment. Our results indicate that analysts may be more vulnerable to sentiment than other market participants.
[ 
Relative returns of recommended stocks
The results of the previous sections support the view that analysts' preference for growth investing results in strong optimism about growth stocks during periods of bullish sentiment. With this in mind, we examine whether this optimism lowers the relative return performance of recommended stocks.
Sentiment's effect on the relative returns of recommended stocks
First, we test Hypothesis 3, which posits that recommended stocks experience lower stock returns following a period of higher investor sentiment. To do so, we perform a two-step regression analysis. At the end of each month, we regress subsequent one-month returns on consensus recommendations as follows:
Here, REC i,t denotes consensus recommendations for stock i at the end of month t. The coefficient t E  can be regarded as a proxy for the relative performance of recommended stocks. 14 Then, we examine whether the time-varying regression coefficient t E  is associated with the market-wide investor sentiment index by running the following regression: The results, shown in Table 3 in the "Un-adjusted" column, reveal that the coefficient t E  , which is the dependent variable in formula (6), is not significantly positive and can even be negative.
In addition, our results reveal that the coefficient t E  is significantly negatively associated with the two sentiment indices. These results support Hypothesis 3, which posits that recommended stocks underperform especially when periods of bullish sentiment.
Mediation by an excessive optimism for growth stocks
In this section, we examine whether the poor relative performance of recommended stocks during periods of bullish sentiment is induced by analysts' optimism for growth stocks during those 13 periods. To this end, we test Hypothesis 4, which posits that there is no significant negative association between investor sentiment and the relative return performance, after controlling for growth factors.
With this in mind, we regress subsequent stock returns on consensus recommendations and growth characteristics (SG, LTG TURN, BP, and EP), as follows:
The coefficient of REC ( t F0  ) in model (7) is regarded as a proxy for the relative performance of recommended stocks, after controlling for growth factors. Then, we regress the coefficient on the sentiment index as follows:  in the regression model (7) is used as a weight.
The regression results, shown in Table 3 in the "Growth characteristics adjusted" column, reveal that the coefficient This result supports Hypothesis 4, which posits that the poor relative return performance of recommended stocks during periods of bullish sentiment is no longer observed after controlling for growth factors. It thus supports the argument that the poor relative performance of recommended stocks after periods of bullish sentiment is induced by analysts' biased views on growth stocks during those periods.
Effects of other stock characteristics
In this section, to check the robustness of our results, we analyze the possibility that the effect of sentiment on the relative return performance of stocks with other characteristics accounts for the poor relative performance of recommended stocks after periods of bullish sentiment.
Momentum and size effects
We first distinguish the effects of sentiment on the relative return performance of recommended stocks from the well-known co-movements of size and momentum effects. Baker and Wurgler report that when beginning-of-period proxies for investor sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks. Further, Antoniou et al. (2013) have shown that investor sentiment is 14 positively associated with the profitability of price momentum strategies. Therefore, we examine whether size and momentum effects account for our results. To this end, we regress subsequent stock returns on the decile ranks of SIZE (market capitalization) and MOMENTUM (returns from t -12 months to t -2 months), in addition to REC, as follows:
Here, dMOMENTUM, and dSIZE are the decile ranks of SIZE and MOMENTUM, respectively.
The coefficient t G0
 can be regarded as a proxy for the relative performance of recommended stocks, after controlling for size and momentum effects. The coefficient of REC ( (9) is regressed on the sentiment index as follows:  in the regression model (9) is used as a weight.
We control for size and momentum effects by including the size and momentum factors in regression model (9), and not by including the Carhart momentum and Fama-French SMB factors as independent variables in regression model (10), because these effects on the relative returns of recommended stocks are time-varying. Figure 2 plots the spreads in dSIZE and dMOMENTUM between the top-REC quintile (recommended stocks) and the bottom-REC quintile (least favorably recommended stocks). As shown in Figure 2 , the spreads in these variables are time-varying. For example, during the dot-com bubble and the global financial crisis, dSIZE is higher for recommended stocks than for the stocks least favorably recommended, while after the burst of the bubble and the crisis, dSIZE is lower for recommended stocks than for the stocks least favorably recommended. In addition, the spread in dMOMENTUM fluctuates greatly over the short run. This indicates that we should control for size and momentum effects at the end of each month, and therefore, we include the size and momentum factors in regression model (9).
Our results, as shown in Table 3 in the "Size & momentum adjusted" column, reveal that the coefficient k d G is significantly negative. These results indicate that the relative returns of recommended stocks are significantly negatively associated with investor sentiment, even after controlling for size and momentum effects. Thus, it is unlikely that the size and momentum effects account for the negative sentiment effect on the relative return of recommended stocks.
[ Figure 2] 6.3.2 Effects of sentiment on difficult-to-value stocks Baker and Wurgler report that bullish investor sentiment lowers the subsequent stock returns of difficult-to-value stocks. Although we are unable to observe any strong effect of sentiment on analysts' recommendations for difficult-to-value stocks in our study 15 , it is possible that this effect of sentiment accounts for the poor relative return performance of recommended stocks during periods of bullish sentiment.
To assess this, we regress subsequent stock returns on the decile ranks of difficult-to-value characteristics, in addition to dSIZE, dMOMENTUM, and REC, as follows:
Here, dAGE and dVOLATILITY are the decile ranks of AGE (the number of years since a firm's foundation year 16 ) and VOLATILITY (the standard deviation of monthly returns over 12 months), respectively. dESG represents extremeness in sales growth. We first calculate vigintile ranks for sales growth (the change in net sales divided by prior-year net sales) minus 10.5, and then define dESG as the absolute value of the rank minus 0.5. dESG has a value of 1, 2, 3, … 9, or 10, with a higher value representing a more extreme level of sales growth. dEEF represents extremeness in external financing. We first calculate vigintile ranks for external financing (the change in assets minus the change in retained earnings divided by assets) minus 10.5, and then define dEEF as the absolute value of the rank minus 0.5. dEEF has a value of 1, 2, 3, … 9, or 10, with a higher value representing a more extreme level of external financing. NE is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if earnings are less than 0, and takes on a value of 0 otherwise. NP is a binary variable that has a value of 1 if a firm is non-dividend-paying, and otherwise has a value of 0. In Baker and Wurgler's study, these characteristic indicators (dAGE, dVOLATILITY, dESG, dEEF, NE, NP) and the firm size characteristic (dSIZE) are used to distinguish difficult-to-value stocks from others. In accordance with Baker and Wurgler's study, difficult-to-value stocks were regarded as including small stocks (stocks with low dSIZE), young stocks (stocks with low dAGE), high-volatility stocks (stocks with high dVOLATILITY), negative earnings stocks (stocks for which NE=1), non-dividend-paying stocks (stocks for which NP=1), extreme growth stocks (stocks with high dESG), and stocks with extremely high and low external financing (stocks with high dEEF).
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15 A more detailed analysis of sentiment's effect on analysts' views on difficult-to-value stocks is presented in the Appendix. 16 In Baker and Wurgler's study, AGE is the number of years since a firm's first appearance on CRSP. However, there are several well-established firms that have long histories, but which are not listed on stock markets until recently. It is for this reason that we define age as the number of years since a firm's foundation year. 17 In Baker and Wurgler's study, stocks with low asset tangibility and extreme BP stocks are also regarded as difficult-to-value stocks. However, since the sentiment effect on the relative returns of these stocks is not observed in their study, we do not include these characteristics as control variables in equation (11).
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Thus, the coefficient of REC ( t H 0  ) can be regarded as a proxy for the relative performance of recommended stocks, after controlling for the effects of the momentum characteristic and difficult-to-value characteristics. We regress the coefficient t H 0  on the sentiment index in the following manner:
The coefficient The regression results, shown in Table 3 in the "Size, momentum, & DV adjusted" column, reveal that the coefficient t H 0  is significantly negatively associated with the two sentiment indices. This result indicates that the relative returns for recommended stocks are significantly negatively associated with investor sentiment, even after the effect of difficult-to-value characteristics is controlled for. Thus, it is unlikely that the effect of sentiment on difficult-to-value stocks accounts for the poor relative return performance of recommended stocks during periods of bullish sentiment.
Earnings estimation or discount rate estimation errors
In this study, we focus on analysts' preference for growth investing as the reason for their excessive sensitivity to market-wide sentiment. Since evaluations of firms' growth components are highly sensitive to discount rate estimations, we predict that bullish market-wide sentiment would result in analysts' excessive optimism about growth stocks, due to irrationally low discount rate estimations. On the other hands, since analysts' earnings forecasts are influenced by market-wide sentiment (Hribar and McInnis, 2012; Walther and Willis, 2013) , their excessive optimism about growth stocks can be attributed to earnings forecast optimism about those stocks. In other words, during periods of bullish sentiment, stocks with high growth potential tend to receive buy recommendations due to upwardly biased earnings forecasts.
If this is the case, recommended stocks will also experience more negative earnings forecast revisions, which could have a negative impact on relative return performance of those stocks, following periods of higher investor sentiment. With this in mind, we perform a two-step regression analysis to test this possibility. Subsequent earnings revisions (earnings revisions over month t+1) are regressed on consensus recommendations as: (13) can be regarded as a proxy for the extent to which recommended stocks receive more positive (or less negative) earnings forecast revisions relative to less favorably recommended stocks. We regress this coefficient on the sentiment index as follows:
18 experience more negative earnings forecast revisions after periods of higher sentiment. Thus, the optimism for growth stocks during periods of bullish sentiment is likely to result from irrationally low discount rate estimations rather than earnings forecast optimism during such periods.
[ Table 5 ]
Conclusion
Previous studies have argued that market-wide sentiment primarily affects individual noise traders (De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Lee et al., 1991) . Contrary to this view, in this study, we show that financial analysts, who are sophisticated market participants, may be more vulnerable to sentiment than other market participants. We focus on analysts' preference for growth investing as the reason for their vulnerability to sentiment, and predict that, due to this preference, their fair value estimates for growth stocks would be more upwardly biased by bullish market-wide sentiment than those of other market peers. As a result, financial analysts may consider growth stocks to be undervalued, especially during periods of bullish sentiment. In addition, we predict that this excessive influence of market-wide sentiment would not be aligned with the investment value of their stock recommendations. More specifically, we argue that financial analysts' optimism about growth stocks during periods of bullish sentiment could lower the relative performance of recommended stocks.
In accordance with our predictions, we find that growth stocks receive more favorable stock recommendations after periods of higher investor sentiment, although those stocks are more overvalued during such periods. Furthermore, our results reveal that the relative return performance of recommended stocks is lower when market-wide investor sentiment is higher. This negative association continues to be observed even when we control for momentum and difficult-to-value characteristics. However, it is no longer observed when we control for growth characteristics. These results support the inference that the poor relative performance of recommended stocks during periods of bullish sentiment is induced by analysts' biased views about growth stocks. Finally, our results suggest that optimism about growth stocks is attributable to irrational discount rate estimations, rather than to their earnings forecast errors.
Our analyses raise the possibility that sentiment could primarily affect professional financial analysts, who are considered more sophisticated market participants than individual noise traders.
Thus, our findings suggest that not only noise-trader-driven sentiment effects exist for asset prices, but also financial-analyst-driven sentiment effects.
Compared with individual noise traders, financial analysts are well-experienced, and their experience might reduce the influence of sentiment on their stock recommendations. However, unlike individual noise traders, their activity is heavily affected by their companies' economic incentives, which could result in their excessive preference for growth investing. Therefore, their companies' economic incentives may make analysts more vulnerable to market-wide sentiment, by inducing a strong preference for growth investing. Table 1 Sentiment and relative performance of growth stocks Weighted least squares regression results for Eq. (2) are shown in this table. The "Average" row shows time-series averages for the dependent variables from Eq. (2). "Max"/"Min"/"SD" are the maximum value/minimum value/standard deviation of the dependent variables, respectively. The "BW Idx" row presents the coefficients of the index constructed by BW. The "Michigan Idx" row shows the coefficients of the Michigan consumer sentiment index.
The "SG," "LTG," "TURN," "BP," and "EP" columns show the regression results when dSG, dLTG, dTURN, dBP, and dEP are used as growth indicators, respectively. The figures in parentheses are simple t-statistics. ** indicates one-sided statistical significance at 5%. Table 2 Sentiment and analysts' views on growth stocks Ordinary least squares regression results for Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are shown in Table 2(a) and Table 2 The "Average" row presents time-series averages of the dependent variables of the equations. "Max"/"Min"/"SD"
show the maximum value/minimum value/standard deviation of the dependent variables, respectively. The "B&W Idx" row shows the coefficients of the index constructed by BW. The "Michigan Idx" row shows the coefficients of the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. The "Un-adjusted," "Growth characteristics adjusted," "Size & momentum adjusted," and "Size, momentum, & DV adjusted" columns show the regression results for Eq. (8) Table 4 Earnings forecast errors for recommended stocks
The weighted least squares regression results for Eq. (14) presents time-series averages of the dependent variables of Eq. (A.1). "Max"/"Min"/"SD" present the maximum value/minimum value/standard deviation of the dependent variables, respectively. The "B&W Idx" row presents the coefficients for the index constructed by BW. The "Michigan Idx" row presents the coefficients of the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. The "AGE," "VOLATILITY," "EF," "NE," "NP," "ESG," and "SIZE" columns show the regression results for when inversed-ranked dAGE, dVOLATILITY, dEEF, NE, NP, dESG, and inversed-ranked dSIZE influences, in accordance with the work of Baker and Wurgler, we conduct our investigation by using an orthogonal version of the indices, which we obtain by regressing the indices for a set of macroeconomic variables.
LTG revision EPS revision
